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STATE CIVIL SERVICE LAW-CIVIL SERVICE RESTRICTIONS ON CONTRACT-
INC OUT BY STATE AGENCIES-Washington Federation of State Employ-
ees v. Spokane Community College, 90 Wn. 2d 698, 585 P.2d 474
(1978).
Washington State Community College District 17 solicited bids to pro-
vide janitorial services for a new administration building at Spokane
Community College (College), and subsequently awarded a one-year
contract to an independent contractor who was to furnish all labor, sup-
plies, equipment, and supervision in performance of the agreement. I The
College chose not to hire civil service employees as it had done previ-
ously, because it could save over $10,000 annually 2 by "contracting
out." ' 3 The funds saved were to be used for student instruction.4 No civil
service employees of the College were to be discharged as a result of the
contract. 5
Plaintiff, the union representing the College's civil service employees,
objected to the College's advertisements for bids on the grounds that any
1. Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. Spokane Community College, No. 54831, Com-
plaint at 11 (Wash. Super. Ct., Thurston County, June 2, 1976) (Exhibit B, invitation to bid). The
contractor's exclusive right of supervision is critical. The degree of supervision an employer (here the
College) may exercise is usually the decisive criterion for determining whether an individual is an
employee or an independent contractor. See note 8 infra.
2. The College received 13 bids, which ranged from $2,460 to $39,600 annually. Brief for
Appellant at 2, Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. Spokane Community College, 90 Wn. 2d
698, 585 P.2d 474 (1978). Employing a civil service custodian to perform the same work would have
cost the College $15,684 annually. Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. Spokane Community
College, 90 Wn. 2d 698, 699, 585 P.2d 474, 476 (1978). American Building Maintenance Company
of Spokane offered to provide the required services for $4,788 per year, and this bid was accepted.
The College also planned to save an additional $210,000 annually by hiring independent contractors
to perform custodial services in five other new buildings and additions. Id. at 699-700, 585 P.2d at
476.
3. "Contracting out" (also known as "subcontracting" or "contracting") has been defined as
"the transfer [by governmental entities] of responsibility for the performance of desired functions,
mostly of a personal service (i.e., administrative) nature, to private institutions." Miller, Administra-
tion by Contract:A New Concern for the Administrative Lawyer, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 957, 968 (1961).
See Heyman, Government by Contract: Boon or Boner?, 21 PuB. AD. Rev. 59, 61 (1961). In analyz-
ing Spokane, contracting out is perhaps most accurately defined as "a term of art meaning the re-
placement of members of the bargaining unit by the employees of an independent contractor perform-
ing the same work under similar conditions of employment." [1977] 1 PUB. EMPL. BARGAIN. (CCH)
3525. This definition does not precisely fit the facts of Spokane, however, because no employees
were to be replaced as a result of the agreement with the contractor. The term intrinsically possesses a
certain degree of imprecision. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215 n.8
(1964) (dictum).
4. 90 Wn. 2d at 700, 585 P.2d at 476.
5. Id. at 701, 585 P.2d at 477.
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resulting contract would violate the State Higher Education Personnel
Law. 6 After the contract was awarded the union secured a temporary in-
junction prohibiting the College from implementing it. The union moved
for summary judgment, and the College responded with a cross-motion
for summary judgment. The trial court granted the College's motion. 7
By a six to three majority the Washington Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the College's agreement with the independent contractor 8
was contrary to the purposes of the merit system9 established by the State
Higher Education Personnel Law. 10 Washington Federation of State Em-
ployees v. Spokane Community College, 90 Wn. 2d 698, 585 P.2d 474
(1978). ' The court stated the governing principle to be that "where a
6. Id. at 699-700, 585 P.2d at 476. See State Higher Education Personnel Law. WASH REV
CODE ch. 28B. 16 (1979).
7. 90 Wn. 2d at 700, 585 P.2d at 476.
8. Washington has adopted the test set forth in Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (1958) for
determining whether services are provided by an employee or an independent contractor. Holling-
berry v. Dunn, 68 Wn. 2d 75, 79-81, 411 P.2d 431, 435-36 (1966). The crucial factor is the "con-
trol or right of control resident in the employer or principal." Id. at 81,411 P.2d at 436. An indepen-
dent contractor is responsible for the results of the work performed, and the employer has no control
"as to the manner or means by which. . . [the work] is accomplished." Miles v. Pound Motor Co.,
10 Wn. 2d 492, 505, 117 P.2d 179, 184 (1941). The College had no right to control the manner in
which the janitorial work was performed, since the contractor was responsible for providing "all
[1]abor, [slupplies, [miaterials, [elquipment and [slupervision." Washington Fed'n of State
Employees v. Spokane Community College, No. 54831, Complaint at II (Wash. Super. Ct., Thurs-
ton County, June 2, 1976) (Exhibit B, invitation to bid) (emphasis added).
9. A merit system "in modem government means a personnel system in which comparative merit
ar [sic] achievement governs each individual's selection and progress in the service and in which the
conditions and rewards of performance contribute to the competency and continuity of the service."
0. STAHL, PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION 42 (7th ed. 1976) (emphasis in original). See also id. at
361. "Merit system" also has been defined as a mechanism "based on (1) competitive examinations,
(2) relative security of tenure, and (3) political neutrality." P. VAN RIPE, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES CIvIL SERVICE 100 (1958).
10. The legislature has stated the purpose of this statute as follows:
The interests of state institutions of higher education and the employees of those institutions will
be furthered by the enactment of a system of personnel administration designed specifically to
meet particular needs in connection with employer-employee relations in the state institutions of
higher education. The general purpose of this chapter is to establish a system of personnel ad-
ministration for the institutions of higher education in the state which is based on merit princi-
ples and scientific methods, and which governs the appointment, promotion, transfer, layoff,
recruitment, retention, classification and pay plans, removal, discipline, and welfare of employ-
ees covered under this chapter.
WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.16.010 (1979).
11. Spokane is the first Washington case which has expressly dealt with the precise issue of the
legality of contracting for services which could be performed by civil servants. The Washington court
held in a prior case that civil service cafeteria employees could not be terminated and replaced by an
independent contractor's personnel when the public employer had not satisfied any of the criteria for
discharging civil servants. Cunningham v. Community College Dist. No. 3, 79 Wn. 2d 793, 489
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new need for services which have been customarily and historically pro-
vided by civil servants arises, and where there is no showing that civil
servants could not provide those services," 12 contracting out is illegal.
Spokane would have controlled all contracting out by state agencies, 13
but the decision elicited a limited legislative response which constricts its
applicability. Six months after Spokane was decided the legislature en-
acted a statute14 (1979 Act) which provides that neither the State Higher
Education Personnel Law 15 nor the State Civil Service Law16 prohibit
contracting out if the services "were regularly purchased by valid con-
tract at such" agency' 7 before the Act's effective date. ' 8 A proviso states
that "no such contract" can be executed or renewed if it would "have the
P.2d 891 (1971). See note 88 infra (discharge criteria). The Cunningham court did not object to
contracting for services which could be rendered by civil servants, and apparently assumed the con-
tract would have been a valid method for discharging the employees had the public employer been
able to comply with the requisite dismissal criteria. See 79 Wn. 2d at 804, 489 P.2d at 897. Spokane
therefore represents an implicit overruling of Cunningham.
12. 90 Wn. 2d at 702-03, 585 P.2d at 477. See id. at 704, 585 P.2d at 478 (contracting for
services which are "ordinarily provided, and capable of being provided by civil servants" is illegal).
13. The Spokane decision involved the State Higher Educational Personnel Law, but the legisla-
tively declared purpose of this statute and that of the State Civil Service Law, which governs all other
state civil servants, are virtually identical. Compare WASH. REv. COD § 28B.16.010 (1979), repro-
duced in note 10 supra, with WASH. Rav. CODE § 41.06.010 (1979). Given this similarity, the court
could not legitimately distinguish Spokane in a later case involving the State Civil Service Law.
14. Act of April 23, 1979, ch. 46, 1979 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1141 (codified at WASH. Rav.
CODE § 28B.16.240 and § 41.06.380 (1979)). The Act provides, in relevant part:
NEW SECTION. Section 1. There is added to chapter 36, Laws of 1969 ex. sess. and to chapter
28B.16 RCW a new section to read as follows:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall prohibit any institution of higher education, as defined
in RCW 28B. 10.0 16, or related board from purchasing services by contract with individuals or
business entities if such services were regularly purchased by valid contract at such institution
prior to the effective date of this act: PROVIDED, That no such contract may be executed or
renewed if it would have the effect of terminating classified employees or classified employee
positions existing at the time of the execution or renewal of the contract.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 2. There is added to chapter 1, Laws of 1961 and to chapter 41.06 RCW a
new section to read as follows:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall prohibit any department, as defined in RCW 41.06.-
020, from purchasing services by contract with individuals or business entities if such services
were regularly purchased by valid contract by such department prior to the effective date of this
act: PROVIDED, That no such contract may be executed or renewed if it would have the effect
of terminating classified employees or classified employee positions existing at the time of the
execution or renewal of the contract.
15. WASH. Ray. CODE ch. 28B.16 (1979).
16. WASH. Rav. ConE ch. 41.06 (1979).
17. Act of April 23, 1979, ch. 46 §§ 1-2, 1979 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1141 (codified at
WASH. REv. CODE § 28B. 16.240 and § 41.06.380 (1979)), reproduced in relevant part in note 14
supra. The 1979 Act applies to both "institutions" of higher education and state "departments." Id.
For the sake of convenience, "agency" will be employed to refer to both terms.
18. The effective date of the Act is April 23, 1979. Id. at 1142.
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effect of terminating" existing civil service employees or positions.' 9
The 1979 Act restricts the scope of Spokane, but it is entirely retrospec-
tive and merely validates contracting for services regularly purchased be-
fore the Act's effective date. 20 The Act has no application when an
existing agency contracts for services it has not regularly purchased from
private entities, but which are traditionally provided by civil servants, or
when a new state agency contracts for services normally provided by civil
service employees. 2 1 Thus Spokane will still govern when a new agency
contracts out, or when an existing state entity purchases services it has not
regularly contracted for, but which are generally provided by civil service
employees.
This note will analyze the Spokane court's rationale for adopting the
"nature of the services" test, which generally prohibits contracting for
services which could be performed by civil service employees. 22 The note
argues that the Spokane rule is unsound for reasons of public policy, and
contrary to the result reached in all but one jurisdiction which has ad-
dressed the issue. Finally, a rule will be proposed which would ade-
quately protect the civil service system without unnecessarily hampering
administrative flexibility and governmental economy in the areas where
the 1979 Act is not applicable.
19. Id. §§ 1-2, at 1141-42, reproduced in relevant part in note 14 supra. If this proviso was
enacted because of pressure from public employee labor unions, the state has arguably surrendered
some of its managerial prerogatives, for by submitting to such pressure the state agrees "to retain
work for employees even though there may be otherwise sound management reasons for having the
work done by outsiders." D. STANLEY & C. COOPER, MANAGING LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER UNION
PREssuRE 93 (1972). See generally Project, Collective Bargaining and Politics in Public Employment
(pts. 2-4) 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 921, 963, 1010 (1972).
20. See note 14 supra (provisions of 1979 Act). The House Committee on State Government
expressly stated that the Act was limited to " 'grandfathering' in those contracts in existence prior to
the effective date of the act." Wash. House Committee on State Government, Bill Report on H.B.
1057 (1979) (on file with Washington Law Review).
21. See Act of April 23, 1979, ch. 46, 1979 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1141 (codified at WASH.
REV. CODE § 28B. 16.240 and § 41.06.380 (1979)), reproduced in relevant part in note 14 supra. To
the extent that any broad legislative policy is discernible beyond the specific terms of the Act, that
policy militates against the application of Spokane to contracts not expressly covered by the 1979
Act. A crucial part of the Spokane court's calculus is whether civil servants could provide the services
in question, see note 12 and accompanying text supra, but within its limited sphere the Act authorizes
contracting for services civil service employees presumably could provide.
22. The "nature of the services" test "involves an inquiry whether persons performing tasks or
exercising skills under the contract are or can be employed through civil service methods." Califor-
nia State Employees' Ass'n v. Williams, 7 Cal. App. 3d 390, 396, 86 Cal. Rptr. 305, 309 (1970).
Although the nature of the services test is not identical to the rule adopted in Spokane because it does
not require that the services have been customarily provided by civil servants, the distinction between
them in practical application is de minimus. See note 101 infra (discussion of similarity of California
and Washington rule). For the sake of convenience, this note refers to the rule adopted in Spokane as
the "nature of the services test."
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I. REASONING OF THE SPOKANE COURT
The court's reversal of the trial court rested upon its conclusion that
contracting for services under the circumstances present in the case
would be repugnant to the purposes underlying the merit system estab-
lished by the State Higher Education Personnel Law. 23 The court be-
lieved that substantial savings do not render such a contract permissible,
because in addition to reducing governmental costs a merit system is de-
signed to foster efficiency and to prevent the existence of a spoils
system.24 The court's adoption of the nature of the services test was
based in large part on its belief that such a test is indispensable to protect-
ing the express and implied rights of civil service employees. 25 The court
stated without analysis that its position was supported by New York, Cal-
ifornia, and federal precedent, and by Professor H. Eliot Kaplan, a lead-
ing authority on civil service law. 26
23. 90 Wn. 2d at 702, 585 P.2d at 477. The College argued it was authorized to contract out by a
statutory amendment granting state agencies power to purchase "services." 90 Wn. 2d at 701, 585
P.2d at 477. See Act of Feb. 20, 1976, ch. 21, §§ 2, 4, 1975 Wash. Laws 2d Ex. Sess. 49, 50
(codified at WASH. REv. CODE §§ 43.19.190(2), (4) (1979)). See generally note 29 infra. The court
concluded that in light of the policies underlying the State Higher Education Personnel Law, the
amendment could not "be construed to authorize contracts for services ordinarily provided, and capa-
ble of being provided by civil servants." 90 Wn. 2d at 704, 585 P.2d at 478.
24. 90 Wn. 2d at 703, 585 P.2d at 477-78.
25. Id. at 705, 585 P.2d at 478-79. The court did not specify what rights it was protecting. In
granting the union's request for a temporary injunction, the trial court believed contracting out would
reduce unspecified employment opportunities of civil service employees. See Washington Fed'n of
State Employees v. Spokane Community College, No. 54831, slip op. at 4 (Wash. Super. Ct.,
Thurston County, June 17, 1976) (memorandum decision granting temporary injunction). Cf. Davi-
son Bd. of Educ., 3 LAB. L. REP. STATE LAWS (CCH) 49,999B.29 (Mich. Empl. Rel. Comm'n
1973) (athough no jobs were lost due to contracting out, public employees would have increased job
security and seniority rights but for the contract). But see American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v.
Hoffmann, 427 F. Supp. 1048, 1086-87 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
A union has a strong interest in preventing contracting out, since contracting out could in some
instances lead to termination of union members. As the employees' representative, the union has a
keen interest in protecting its members' positions, and, less altruistically, in protecting itself from a
resulting loss in dues. See Franck, Federal Wage Regulations and Service Contracts, A.F. L. REV.
17, 20 (Summer 1976).
26. 90 Wn. 2d at 703-04, 585 P.2d at 478. A vigorous dissent argued that the Higher Education
Personnel Law protects only present employees, and does not set aside certain positions or classes of
work which must be filled by civil servants. The dissent's contention that the majority confused the
distinction between an "employee" and a "position" is supported by public personnel administra-
tion literature delineating a crucial distinction between the two terms. See CIvIL SRvIcE AssEMBLY,
PosrnoN-CLAsSntCAOrTON IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 37-39 (1941); INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS Asso-
aATION, MUNICIPAL PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION 33 (6th ed. 1960); Halloran, Why Position Classifica-
tion?, 28 PuB. PERSONNEL REv. 89, 89 (1967). Because the Higher Education Personnel Law applies
only to employees, the dissent concluded that the state has the option of filling service needs by
contracting out or by hiring civil servants. 90 Wn. 2d at 706, 585 P.2d at 479.
423
Washington Law Review Vol. 55:419, 1980
II. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONING
A. Policy Considerations
The court's view that contracting out could foster a spoils system is
unpersuasive. A merit system is not the sole method for restricting
patronage, 27 and empirical evidence strongly suggests competitive bid-
ding is more effective than the state merit system in insulating Washing-
ton state government from improper influences. 28 Because state agencies
must comply with the rigorous statutory safeguards associated with com-
petitive bidding, 29 contracting out should not undercut the merit
system.30
27. California State Employees Ass'n v. Williams, 7 Cal. App. 3d 390. 399, 86 Cal. Rptr. 305,
312 (1970).
28. Political influence and nepotism apparently have only a marginal impact in determining with
whom the state chooses to do its business. LEGISLATIVE BUDGET CoMMrTrEE, PERFORMANCE AUDIT: PUR-
CHASING AND MATERIAL CONTROL, No. 74-9, at 125 app. (1974) (Report to the Wash. State Legisla-
ture) (anonymous survey of state employees engaged in state purchasing). Cf. Savage v. State, 75
Wn. 2d 618, 624, 453 P.2d 613, 617 (1969) (dissenting opinion) (competitive bidding procedures
give state officials few opportunities to exercise favoritism); A.A.B. Elec., Inc., v. Stephenson Pub.
School Dist., 5 Wn. App. 887, 890, 491 P.2d 694, 696 (1971) (all bidders must receive impartial
treatment). But see COMMrrrEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, IMPROVING PRODUCTIVITY IN STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 63 (1976) [hereinafter cited as IMPROVING GOVERNMENT PRODUcnVrrY]; Comment,
Competitive Bidding-Public Construction Contracts in the State of Washington, 39 WASH. L. REv.
796, 807 (1964).
By contrast, a study of the Washington merit system revealed that 5 1% of the state civil service
employees polled were aware of political factors which influenced the selection, transfer, and
promotion of state employes. LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMITTEE, PERFORMANCE AUDIT: STATE PERSONNEL
MERIT SYSTEM, No. 76-8, at 42 (1976) (Report to the Wash. State Legislature). Given this evidence,
the Spokane court's unspoken assumption that Washington's merit system manifests fewer aspects of
a spoils system than competitive bidding is of questionable accuracy. See generally J. SHAFRrrz, PUB.
LIC PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, THE HERITAGE OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 45-57 (1975).
29. "The director of general administration, through the state purchasing and material control
director," is responsible for purchasing nearly all "material, supplies, services and equipment'"
needed by state agencies. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.19.190(2) (1979). If cost restrictions and the items
to be purchased are specified, this purchasing authority may be delegated to state agencies. WASH.
REV. CODE § 43.19.190(4) (1979). Such agencies are required to comply with the statutory restric-
tions on purchasing. Id. See note 30 infra.
30. Washington's "strong public policy" in favor of competitive bidding requires that, absent a
legislative exemption, public contracts be "let only after competitive bidding procedures have been
complied with." Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co. v. State, 24 Wn. App. 185, 190, 600 P.2d 643, 646
(1979). Unless one of five limited exceptions apply, services must be purchased on a competitive
basis employing sealed bids. WASH. REv. CODE § 43.19.1906 (1979). See Miller v. State, 73 Wn. 2d
790, 794, 440 P.2d 840, 843 (1968). Purchases under $2500 may be made without sealed bids, but
purchases may not be manipulated so that this exemption applies. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.19.1906(2)
(1979). See Comment, supra note 28, at 797-98 (1964). In addition, purchases between $200 and
$2500 cannot be made without securing sufficient quotations to ensure a competitive price is ob-
tained, and such purchases must be recorded for "audit purposes." WASH. REv. CODE § 43.19.-
1906(2) (1979). Bidding must be genuinely competitive, and failure to receive competitive bids when
they are called for will void any ensuing contract. Comment, supra, at 797-98. The contract must be
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The court's belief that contracting out is impermissible because of the
efficiency rationale underlying the merit system3l is also unconvincing.
The cost differential in Spokane clearly made contracting more efficient 32
than hiring civil service custodians. 33 Many government agencies have
discovered that numerous services can be provided more efficiently by
private concerns than by civil servants, 34 and Washington state agencies
let to the "lowest responsible bidder." WASH. REv. CODE § 43.19.1911(1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §
236-48-093(1977). This bidder is entitled to be awarded the contract "absent good cause to the
contrary," Butler v. Federal Way School Dist., 17 Wn. App. 288, 294, 562 P.2d 271, 275 (1977),
and all essential requirements of the bidding procedure must be complied with, Comment, supra, at
798. Circumscribing competitive bidding is a legislative, not a judicial, function, and courts are wary
of constricting competitive bidding by interpretation of legislatively established competitive bidding
standards. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co. v. State, 24 Wn. App. 185, 190, 600 P.2d 643,646 (1979).
31. Improved governmental efficiency is a principal objective of a merit system. See, e.g., D.
SULLIVAN, PuBuc EMPLOYEE LABOR LAW § 3.4 (1969); R. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW §
1.2[3], at 1-9 (1976). See note 47 infra (judicial recognition in Washington of the primacy of effi-
ciency as a purpose of a merit system). "There is evidence that some [civil service] systems [, how-
ever,] in an effort to formalize the presumed principle of merit and minimize political influence, have
instead reinforced mediocrity and otherwise impeded productivity." IMPROVING GOVERNMENT PRODUC-
nvrry, supra note 28, at 52.
32. "Efficiency" has been defined as "[the comparative relationship between inputs and
outputs or resources used and end products obtained. The more units of output obtained from a given
input, or the less input required to attain a given output, the more efficient is the activity performed."
LEGISLAnvE BUDGET COMMITT'EE, PERFORMANCE AUDIT: STATE PERSONNEL MERIrr SYsEM, No. 76-9, at
109 app. (1976) (Report to the Wash. State Legislature). According to this definition-of efficiency,
the court's distinction between cost savings and efficiency, 90 Wn. 2d at 703, 585 P.2d at
477-78, is fallacious, since the College received the same ouput (janitorial services) with less input
(expenditures for janitorial services). This definition should be accorded special deference in inter-
preting Washington's civil service laws because of the unique status of the definition's author and the
publication in which it appears. The purpose of the Legislative Budget Committee is to foster econ-
omy and efficiency in state government by overseeing various governmental activities and to
determine if legislative intent is being complied with by public agencies and employees. WASH. REv.
CODE §§ 44.28.060-.086 (1979). See LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMn-rEE, REPORTOFTHE LEGISLATIVE BUD-
GET COMM. 1977-79, at 2 (1978) (Report to the Wash. State Legislature). Performance audits are
conducted by the Legislative Budget Committee and are designed to evaluate the efficiency and econ-
omy of governmental operations, and "to ensure that agency programs are being conducted in ac-
cordance with legislative intent and program goals and objectives." WASH. REv. CODE § 44.28.086
(1979). See Graham v. State Bar Ass'n, 86 Wn. 2d 624, 627-28, 548 P.2d 310, 313 (1976);
LEGtsLATIvE BUDGET COMMrIrEE, REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE BuoGEr COMM. 1977-79, at 1-2 (1978)
(Report to the Wash. State Legislature); LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMIErE, BIENNIAL REPORT OFTHE LEG-
tSLATIVE BUDGET COMM. 1975-1977, at 1 (1976) (Report to the Wash. State Legislature).
33. See note 2 supra.
34. See IMPROVING GOVERNMENT PRODUCnVITY, supra note 28, at 62. Contracting out best im-
proves efficiency when purchasing transportation, maintenance, food, and similar services, see id.,
all of which could be, and arguably customarily have been, provided by civil servants. One commen-
tator has argued that "relative efficiency and effectiveness" should be the ultimate criteria in deter-
mining whether to contract out or employ public employees. Johnson, The Expanding Role of
Contract in the Administration of Research and Development Programs, 31 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
747, 764 (1963).
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should be no exception. 35 In addition, the productivity of state civil ser-
vants may be enhanced by their employer's potential to contract out, be-
cause knowledge that a contractor could perform the service may provide
an incentive for civil service employees to improve their performance. 36
Contracting out may also serve to restrain strikes37 and excessive wage
demands by public employees, 38 presumably because it places market
35. There are "significant inhibitors to productivity" in Washington's merit system. ADVISORY
COUNCIL ON STATE GOVERNMENT PRODUCTIVITY, STATE OF WASHINGTON, FINAL REPORT 8 (1976). Both
management and employees in the state civil service have serious reservations about the quality of
Washington's merit system. LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMITrEE, PERFORMANCE AUDIT: STATE PERSONNEL
MERIT SYSTEM, No. 76-9, at 37-55 (1976) (Report to the Wash. State Legislutare). Many managerial
personnel occasionally find it necessary to circumvent merit system rules to perform their jobs effec-
tively. Id. at 44. Empirical evidence appears to support the contention of many managers of state
agencies that civil service regulations significantly inhibit state government productivity. E. CRANL.
B. LENTZ & J. SHAFRITZ, STATE GOVERNMENT PRODUCTIVITY 217 (1976). The platitude that a strong civil
service fosters "productivity improvement efforts and ... higher levels of productivity" is therefore
not necessarily accurate. Id. at 186. Accord, IMPROVING GOVERNMENT PRODUCTIVITY, supra note 28. at
52.
36. See IMPROVING GOVERNMENT PRODUCTIVITY. supra note 28. at 63.
37. Washington State civil servants have the right to bargain collectively. Ortblad v. State, 85
Wn. 2d 109, 114, 530 P.2d 635, 639 (1975). See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28B.16.100(10)-(13), 41.-
06.150(10)-(13) (1979). See generally Comment, Public Employees Bargaining Rights in Washing-
ton, 14 GONz. L. REV. 197, 211-15 (1978). They do not, however, have the right to strike. WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 28B. 16.100(13), 41.06.150(13) (1979). See generally Decker, The Right to Strike for
Pennsylvania's Public Employees-Its Scope, Limits, and Ramifications for the Public Employer, 17
DuoQ. L. REV. 755, 759 n.21 (1979) (summary of arguments for and against granting public employ-
ees the right to strike). The frequency with which public employees engage in illegal strikes
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of such a statutory prohibition. Damas & Smith, The Public Em-
ployer's Right to Unilateral Action: A Management Perspective, 8 J.L. & EDuc. 509, 509 (1979).
Proponents of public employee strikes argue that prohibitions on striking are ineffective because
"public employees will strike despite legislation or court decisions to the contrary." Decker, supra.
at 759 n.21. Strikes which deprive the public of essential services arguably even threaten the demo-
cratic process. Elected representatives may be compelled to set budget priorities contrary to their best
judgment because they may be forced to capitulate to the demands of striking public employees. See
City of New York v. De Lury, 23 N.Y.2d 175, 183, 186, 243 N.E.2d 128, 132, 134, 295 N.Y.S.2d
901, 906, 909 (1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 455 (1969); Project, supra note 19, at 1033.
38. See Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by' Public Employees, 79 YALE
L.J. 418, 425-26 (1970). Cf. City of New York v. De Lury, 23 N.Y.2d 175, 183, 243 N.E.2d 128.
132, 295 N.Y.S.2d 901, 906 (1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 455 (1969) (striking city employ-
ees, at the expense of the public and other civil servants, could paralyze a city and obtain gains
disproportionate to the value of their services); H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE
CITIES 62-64 (1971) (public employer is generally in poor position to resist wage demands by public
employees); Decker, supra note 37, at 759 (effectiveness of strike by public employees determined
by the importance of the service, "the political cohesiveness and importance of the clientele
... deprived of the service," and the degree to which this clientele can pressure the public employer
to reach a settlement). Contracting out may thus serve to reduce public expenditures in two distinct
ways. A state operated service which is terminated by contracting out to achieve cost savings will
reduce expenditures directly. By tempering the wage demands of employees who perform services
which remain under state control, contracting out indirectly reduces public expenditures.
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constraints on civil servants similar to those faced by private employees
in labor negotiations. 39 Contracting out thus comports with the efficiency
rationale of the merit system, for it improves the efficiency of services
contracted for, diminishes the possibility of disruptive strikes, reduces
state labor costs, and arguably enhances the performance of civil ser-
vants.
Spokane establishes a restrictive rule which unnecessarily hampers the
administrative discretion40 and flexibility provided by the ability to con-
tract out.41 Under the Spokane rule, the public employer will have to se-
cure necessary services from civil servants although they may be more
costly. Such a broad rule will likely hinder administrative innovation. An
agency's primary function of serving the public will be correspondingly
impaired, 42 and the state may be forced either to increase appropriations,
reduce services, or not improve or expand existing services.
The nature of the services test is not necessary to protect the civil
service system from deterioration. Practical limitations will prevent con-
tracting out on a large scale, 43 and the civil service system can be ade-
quately protected by the more liberal tests adopted in other jurisdic-
tions. 44 The court's goal of protecting the merit system is laudable, but
39. Cf. City of New York v. De Lury, 23 N.Y.2d 175, 186, 243 N.E.2d 128, 133-34, 295
N.Y.S.2d 901, 909 (1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 455 (1969) (marketplace has restraining ef-
fect on employee demands in private, but not public, sector); Decker, supra note 37, at 759 n.21
(economic considerations of private sector lacking in public sector); Project, supra note 19, at 1017
(In contrast to private sector unions, public employee unions are "restrained more by political than
by market forces."). See generally Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 227-29 (1977).
40. As one court noted, "[riesponsible executive officials must be given broad discretion in pro-
curing supplies and services for the Government. Constant judicial intervention to review the merits
of a particular procurement decision would unduly burden the managerial effectiveness of the execu-
tive branch." American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Hoffmann, 427 F. Supp. 1048, 1079 (N.D.
Ala. 1976).
41. Local 2855, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States, 602 F.2d 574, 582 (3d Cir.
1979) (Army may consider "greater flexibility in adjusting to workload fluctuations and the ability to
reallocate manpower authorizations to support combat forces" in determining whether to contract out
or have services provided by government employees); S. REP. No. 94-446, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
37-38 (1975) (flexibility provided by contracting out necessary to meet workload variations);
Heyman, supra note 3, at 61; Miller, supra note 3, at 979. Contracting out can serve as a means to
avoid budgetary or personnel ceilings. ImPovoV GovRnNr PRoDucnvrr, supra note 28, at
62-63; Miller, supra, at 979. But see Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 § 6(c) (3), 44
Fed. Reg. 20,556 (1979), reprinted in 8 Gov-r CoNT. REP. (CCH) (Cont. Cas. Fed.) 990 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Circular A-76].
42. See, e.g., note 113 infra.
43. H. WEauNaroN & R. Wwnm, supra note 38, at 65.
44. New York, for example, has long subscribed to a rule which validates an agreement made in
good faith with a genuine independent contractor. See notes 60-71 and accompanying text infra. Yet
there is no indication, even in the most recent New York decisions, that this rule has in any way
damaged the merit system. Federal law allows contracting out even more liberally, see notes 49-58
and accompanying text infra, but the federal civil service has unquestionably thrived.
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the means it has chosen to achieve it are anachronistic, 45 and unneces-
sarily impair other significant public objectives.
B. Positions of Other Jurisdictions
Contrary to the Spokane court's statement that its "position is firmly
supported in civil service law," ' 46 the clear weight of authority
demonstrates that contracting out for services which are customarily pro-
vided by civil servants is compatible with the purposes 47 underlying the
merit system.48
45. See note 102 infra.
46. 90 Wn. 2d at 703, 585 P.2d at 478.
47. Washington courts have clearly enunciated the purposes of the state merit system. Its primary
purpose comports with the "traditional principle of the merit system of public employment, i.e. the
delimitation or elimination of the spoils system," Gogerty v. Department of Insts., 71 Wn. 2d 1, 4,
426 P.2d 476, 478 (1967), which will in turn result in more efficient public service. See Herriott v.
City of Seattle, 81 Wn. 2d 48, 61, 500 P.2d 101, 109 (1972); Osterlof v. University of Wash., 17
Wn. App. 621, 625, 564 P.2d 814, 816 (1977). The civil service is designed to create an employer-
employee relationship, see Olson v. University of Wash., 89 Wn. 2d 558, 561, 573 P.2d 1308, 1310
(1978), which will "establish an orderly system of personnel administration and management," Bel-
lingham Firefighters, Local 106 v. City of Bellingham, 15 Wn. App. 662, 665, 551 P.2d 142, 144
(1976), and to protect civil servants against unjustified dismissal, e.g., State ex rel. Voris v. City of
Seattle, 74 Wash. 199, 204, 133 P. 11, 13 (1911); 1972 Op. WASH. ATrry GEN . No. 19, at 4.
48. The Spokane court not only misconstrued the existing legal consensus, but also improperly
relied on Washington precedent and Professor Kaplan as support for its decision. The court cited a
Washington Court of Appeals decision, Osterlof v. University of'Wash., 17 Wn. App. 621, 564 P.2d
814 (1977), as authority for its adoption of the nature of the services test. 90 Wn. 2d at 702, 585 P.2d
at 477. The Osterlof court held that when the work force is reduced a non-civil-service employee
must be released before a civil servant may be discharged. The case is clearly distinguishable from
Spokane, because the improperly retained individual, who purported to be an "outside consultant,"
was a de facto employee of the University although not hired pursuant to civil service requirements.
The court believed that retention of this consultant was a circumvention of the State Higher Education
Personnel Law. 17 Wn. App. at 624-25, 564 P.2d at 816. By contrast, the custodial firm in Spokane
was a bona fide independent contractor hired in good faith. See Washington Fed'n of State Employ-
ees v. Spokane Community College, No. 54831, slip op. at 5 (Wash. Super. Ct., Thurston County,
Nov. 24, 1976) (memorandum decision granting College's motion for summary judgment). The
Washington Supreme Court also relied on one of its earlier decisions. Cunningham v. Community
College Dist. No. 3, 79 Wn. 2d 793, 489 P.2d 891 (1971). Such reliance is misplaced. See note II
supra.
Although part of the quotation from Professor Kaplan cited by the court, 90 Wn. 2d at 703, 585
P.2d at 478, arguably supports its position, Kaplan's final conclusion is that contracting out is
improper only if the agency supervises the performance of the contract, or the agreement is a device
to avoid civil service requirements. H. KAPLAN, THE LAW OF CIVIL SERVICE 99 (1958). See id., at
86-88 (agreement with independent contractor permissible). In a more recent work, an eminent legal
scholar in the civil service area did not object to contracting out although civil service custodians are
thereby discharged. R. VAUGHN, supra note 31, § 4.4, at 4-24.
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1. Federal law
The nature of the services test has not been found necessary to protect
the federal civil service system. A contract for janitorial services virtu-
ally identical to the agreement in Spokane has in fact been incorporated
into the federal regulations as an exemplar of a permissible contract. 49
According to federal precedent, contracting out is permissible so long
as an employer-employee relationship is not established between the gov-
ernment and the contract personnel. 50 Whether this relationship has been
created is determined by application of traditional common law principles
distinguishing employees from independent contractors. 51
The federal government's general policy is to contract out rather than
hire civil servants, 52 as long as the contract does not establish the pro-
49. 32C.F.R. § 22.102.3(b)(iii) (1976).
50. Lodge 1858, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Webb, 580 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 927 (1978). Although Webb was decided seven months before Spokane, the Washing-
ton court relied on the district court's opinion, Lodge 1858, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Ad-
ministrator, NASA, 424 F. Supp. 186 (D.D.C. 1976), which was substantially modifed by Webb.
Spokane's reliance on the district court's decison (NASA) is inappropriate for another reason. The
entire issue in NASA was whether certain contractual arrangements created an illegal employer-em-
ployee relationship between NASA and the contract personnel. The district court upheld all contracts
where such a relationship had not been established.
51. Lodge 1858, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Webb, 580 F.2d 496, 506-08 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 927 (1978). The crucial consideration is the degree of supervision the govern-
ment exercises over the contract personnel. See NASA, 424 F. Supp. 186, 214 (D.D.C. 1976) (con-
tract which violated five of six criteria established by the United States Civil Service Commission for
determining if contractor personnel are de facto government employees upheld because "substantial
degree" of supervision absent). If control of the physical conduct of the details of the individual's
work is exercised by the contractor, the individual is not a government employee. Lodge 1858, Am.
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Webb, 580 F.2d at 506-08. For a criticism of the Civil Service Com-
mission's standards and the common law test as a means of determining whether an individual is a
federal government employee, see Kornreich & Schwartz, The New "Law" of Government Service
Contracts, 28 FD. B.J. 239 (1968).
52. "It is a stated policy of the federal government to rely on the private enterprise system to
supply its needs except when the national interest requires that the government provide directly the
products and services it uses." Local 2855, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States, 602
F.2d 574, 576-77 (3d Cir. 1979). This policy is set by the Office of Management and Budget.
Circular A-76, supra note .41, §§ 2, 4(a). All executive agencies must conform to this policy. Id. §
6(a). The Comptroller General, however, has concluded that the Circular expresses executive policy
but does not have the force of law. 8 Gov-r. CoNT. REP. (CCH) (Cont. Cas. Fed.) 83,319. But cf. 12
CoNT. CAs. FED. 81,336 (decision by Comptroller General that Circular A-76's policy is outside of
his jurisdiction). Certain inherently governmental functions are exempt from this policy and require
performance by government employees. See Circular A-76, supra note 41, § 4(b). These exempted
governmental functions fall within three broad categories: (1) "[discretionary application of
Government[all authority;" (2) "[mlonetary transactions and entitlements;" and (3) "[in-house
core capabilities in the area of research, development, and testing, needed for technical analysis and
evaluation and technology base management and maintenance." Id. §§ 5(f)(1)-(3) (emphasis in origi-
nal). If the "government function" exception is not applicable, an executive agency can avoid con-
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scribed relationship. 53 The decision to contract out or employ civil ser-
vants is a matter of broad administrative discretion 54 which will not be
overturned unless an agency acts arbitrarily or capriciously. 55 A contract
tracting out only in three limited instances: (1) a satisfactory commercial source is unavailable, id. §
8(a); (2) military personnel should perform an activity related to national defense, id. § 8(b); or (3) in-
house performance is preferable according to cost criteria established by the Office of Management
and Budget. Id. §§ 8-9. See 44 Fed. Reg. 20,564 (1979) (OMB Cost Comparison Handbook which is
to guide executive agencies in making the required cost comparisons).
Government employees displaced by contracting out must receive "maximum effort" from their
ex-agency employer in finding other suitable employment. Circular A-76, supra note 41, § 10(a) (6).
See also id. § 10(a)(5). A displaced employee apparently does not have an enforceable right to such
assistance, however, for the Circular denies standing to challenge agency action on the ground that
the Circular was not complied with. Id. § 3. See generally [197911 GOVT. CoNT. REP. (CCH) (Cont.
Cas. Fed.) 567 (summary of most important provisions of Circular A-76).
53. Circular A-76, supra note 41, § 6(c)(2). The United States Civil Service Commission has
stated that the "touchstone of legality under the personnel laws is whether the contract creates what is
tantamount to an employer-employee relationship between the Government and the employee of the
contractor." Lodge 1858, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Webb, 580 F.2d 496, 507 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 927 (1978) (quoting guideline established by the United States Civil Service
Commission to determine if contract personnel are government employees). Accord, 32 C.F.R. §
22.102. 1(a)(1976) (violation of federal civil service laws for contractor or his employees to be "in
effect employees of the Government"); D. HARVEY, THE CIvIL SERVICE COMMISStON 155 (1970).
Parenthetically, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 abolished the United States Civil Service
Commission as such. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). Its functions, however, were divided between the
Office of Personnel Management and the Merit Systems Protection Board, the latter being designed
to safeguard the merit system and the rights of federal civil servants. Id.
54. [An agency's] decision to carry out some of its functions by using other than Federal civil-
ian employees is a matter solely within the administrative discretion of the agency and the pro-
priety of such a decision is not subject to review or modification by the Civil Service Commis-
sion in the adjudication of the reduction-in-force appeal of any federal civilian employee
affected thereby.
Lodge 1858, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Paine, 436 F.2d 882, 897 n.99 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(quoting United States Civil Service Commission's Board of Appeals and Review) (Robinson, J.,
separate opinion) (emphasis added), discussed in Katz, Service Contracting and Rights of Civil Ser-
vice Personnel, 4 PUs. CoNT. L.J. 1, 12-14 (1971). See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v.
Hoffmann, 427 F. Supp. 1048, 1057, 1065, 1071, 1079 (N.D. Ala. 1976); Bisson, Statutor vLimita-
tions on Contracts for Services of Government Agencies, 34 BROOKLYN L. REV. 197, 222 (1968). But
see note 55 infra.
55. American Fed'n ofGov't Employees v. Hoffmann, 427 F. Supp. 1048, 1084 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
One court, however, recently held that the Army's decision to terminate civil servants by
contracting out was a decision committed solely to the Army's discretion and was therefore immune
from judicial review. Local 2855, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States, 602 F.2d 574 (3d
Cir. 1979). The court concluded that the Army's decision was not reviewable because it could not
discern any applicable statutory or regulatory standards to guide the Army's discretion. Id. at
581-83. The court was nonetheless obligated "to scrutinize the action taken in order to determine
whether specific constititutional, statutory or regulatory dictates have been abridged." Id. at 583.
Under the Local 2855 court's analysis, an agency's decisionmaking process in deciding whether to
contract out, if not guided by statute or regulation, may not be judicially examined, but a court may
scrutinize the substance of the contract apart from that decisionmaking process. Therefore, although
an agency's decision to contract out is not judicially reviewable, any resulting contract may be struck
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is valid although civil servants are capable of performing the work56 and
even if they have traditionally done so.57
Not only are federal regulations and precedent inconsistent with the na-
ture of the services test, but the Comptroller General of the United States,
after originally adhering to a position similar to Spokane's, has long since
rejected it. 58
down, for example, if it establishes an employer-employee relationship between the government and
the contract personnel. See notes 50-51, 53, and accompanying text supra; note 58 infra.
Circular A-76, which establishes the federal government's policy in favor of contracting out, see
note 52 supra, provides for an intra-agency appeal procedure to challenge a decision to perform a
service with contract or government personnel. Circular A-76, supra note 41, § I I(a). The Circular
does not authorize appeals outside the agency or judicial review of the decision. Id. § t 1(b).
56. Although "the Government can obtain civil servants to do the job," this is only "a factor
which might be useful in a doubtful case [in determining if an employer-employee relationship ex-
ists], but should not in its self [sic] create doubt about services which are clearly nonpersonal land
therefore permissible]." 32 C.F.R. § 22.102.2(i)(A) (1976). See American Fed'n of Gov't Employ-
ees v. Hoffmann, 427 F. Supp. 1048, 1056, 1058 (N.D. Ala. 1976). A contract will be upheld even
if civil servants are capable of providing a "substantial portion" of the necessary work because there
is no requirement that they be given an opportunity to do so. Id. at 1071. See Department of Defense
Appropriations fo( 1976: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Department of Defense of the House
Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, 830-32 (1975).
57. "Nothing in the civil service statute or regulations prohibits the government from abolishing
positions held by ... civil servants and contracting out the work previously performed by them."
Local 2855, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States, 602 F.2d 574, 584 (3d Cir. 1979). See
note 58 infra.
58. In a 1972 decision the Comptroller General, in terms reminiscent of the language of Spo-
kane, stated that its earlier policy
held in effect that all services normally performed by Government employees and all services
which could be performed by incumbents of existing civil service positions were "personal ser-
vices" for which there existed no authority to enter into contracts. Since those early decisions, this
Office and the Civil Service Commission have recognized that services normally performed by
Government personnel may be performed under a proper contract if that method of procurement is
found to be more feasible, more economical, or necessary to the accomplishment of the agency's
task.
51 Comp. Gen. 561, 562 (1972) (emphasis added) (overruling 6 Comp. Gen. 364 (1926)). Accord,
44 Comp. Gen. 761, 763 (1965); Letter from Elmer B. Statts, Comptroller General of the United
States, to John L. McClellan, Chairman of the Committee on Government Operations, United States
Senate (April 14, 1967), reprinted in Government Policy and Practice with Respect to Contracts for
Technical Services: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 276, 277 (1967). But see 38 Op. U.S. Air'y GE. 136, 138 (1934); 26 Op. U.S. A-r'v GEN.
363, 374 (1907). Although purchasing services normally provided by government employees is
permissible if contracting out is more economical or feasible, a contract is invalid if the government's
degree of control over the contract personnel establishes an employer-employee relationship. E.g.,
57 Comp. Gen. 431, 433-34 (1978); 57 Comp. Gen. 271, 276 (1978); 51 Comp. Gen. 561, 562
(1972); 50 Comp. Gen. 553, 555-56 (1971); 45 Comp. Gen. 649, 650-51 (1966); 44 Comp. Gen.
761,763-64 (1965).
The Comptroller General has specifically ruled that contracting for janitorial services is permissi-
ble if the contractor provides all the necessary equipment and supplies. 30 Comp. Gen. 333, 334
(1951); 22 Comp. Gen. 700,702 (1943). Even in an instance where these items were furnished by the
government, a janitorial contract was upheld because the contractor's employees did not act under
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2. Precedent of other states contrary to Spokane
The Spokane court noted that the policies of New York's and
Washington's civil service systems are identical, 59 and purported to rely
on New York precedent to support its conclusion that the College's con-
tract was invalid. The court, however, misinterpreted the New York
rule. 60 In New York the crucial factor in determining whether a contract
for services is permissible is the degree of control the public employer
exercises over the contract personnel. 61 If the state exercises such control
over contract personnel that an employer-employee relationship is estab-
lished, the contract is illegal. 62 A contract entered into in good faith will
nonetheless be invalid if it creates the proscribed relationship. 63 The pub-
lic employer, however, has broad discretion in choosing either to procure
services from a contractor or to hire civil service employees. 64 The public
employer must hire in accordance with civil service requirements only if
it "sees fit to have work done or labor performed by individuals directly
direct government supervision and no employer-employee relationship was contemplated. Ms.
Comp. Gen. B-82269, 5 April 1949, discussed in Fairbanks, Personal Service Contracts, 6 MIL. L.
REv. 1, 29 (1959). Contra, 6 Comp. Gen. 474 (1927).
59. 90 Wn. 2d at 704, 585 P.2d at 478.
60. Spokane relied on an early New York decision, Turel v. Delaney, 285 N.Y. 16, 32 N.E.2d
774 (1941), for the proposition that a contract to provide services would violate the civil service laws.
90 Wn. 2d at 703-04, 585 P.2d at 478. Turel is distinguishable from Spokane, however, for a pur-
ported "contractor" was, by later authority, deemed to be an employee of the public employer.
Corwin v. Farrell, 303 N.Y. 61, 100 N.E.2d 135, 138 (1951); Beck v. Board of Educ., 268 A.D.
644, 52 N.Y.S.2d 712, 717 (1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 717, 65 N.E.2d 426 (1946) (per curiam); H.
KAPLAN, supra note 48, at 88-89. For a concise and accurate summary of the current status of New
York law, see New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 456 F. Supp. 85, 91-94 (E.D.
N.Y. 1978), aff 'don other grounds, 596 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 70 (1979).
61. Corwin v. Farrell, 303 N.Y. 61, 100 N.E.2d 135, 138-39 (1951); Conlin v. Aiello, 64
A.D.2d 921,408 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (1978); Westchester County, Civil Service Employees Ass'n v.
Cimino, 58 A.D.2d 869, 396 N.Y.S.2d 692, 694-95 (1977), aff 'd without opinion. 44 N.Y.2d 985,
380 N.E.2d 327, 408 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1978).
62. Corwin v. Farrell, 303 N.Y. 61, 100 N.E.2d 135, 139 (1951). An individual must be a genu-
ine independent contractor; his appellation is immaterial. Varacchi v. State Univ. of N.Y., 62 Misc.
2d 1003, 310 N.Y.S.2d 751, 754 (Sup. Ct. 1970). See Peck v. Belknap, 130 N.Y. 394,400, 29 N.E.
977, 978 (1892); H. KAPLAN, supra note 48, at 87.
63. Corwin v. Farrell, 303 N.Y. 61, 100 N.E.2d 135, 137 (1951); Palmer v. Board of Educ.,
276 N.Y. 222, 11 N.E.2d 887, 888 (1937).
64. Beck v. Board of Educ., 268 A.D. 644, 52 N.Y.S.2d 712, 715 (1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y.
717, 65 N.E.2d 426 (1946) (per curiam); Guastoferri v. Board of Educ., 270 A.D. 946, 62 N.Y.S.2d
257, 258 (1946) (court may not interfere with public employer's discretion in determining whether
contracting out or employing civil servants is more efficient or economical). See Drummond v. Kern,
176 Misc. 669, 27 N.Y.S.2d 332, 337 (Sup. Ct. 1941); H. KAPLAN, supra note 48, at 92. The court
may, however, examine the length of the contract and whether public employees are available to
perform the services to determine if the public employer has abused its discretion. Id. at 93.
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employed," 65 or when contract personnel are de facto state employees. 66
An agreement will be invalidated, however, if it is a device to remove
civil servants without adequate justification 67 or is used to circumvent the
civil service law. 68
New York's position, in sum, is that contracting out is permissible if
the contract is not made in bad faith69 and establishes a genuine em-
ployer-independent contractor relationship. Contrary to the Spokane
court's interpretation of New York law, services may be purchased which
could be provided by civil servants. 70 Indeed, civil service employees
may even be replaced by a contractor who provides identical services. 71
In Ohio, as in New York, a test contrary to that employed by the Spo-
kane court is applied. The Ohio Supreme Court held in State ex rel. Sigall
v. Aetna Cleaning Contractors, Inc., 72 that a contract to provide services
which could be rendered by civil servants would be upheld absent proof
of intent to thwart the purposes of the civil service system. 73 In Sigall an
65. Beck v. Board of Educ., 268 A.D. 644, 52 N.Y.S.2d 712, 715 (1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y.
717, 65 N.E.2d 426 (1946) (per curiam). See Damino v. County of Nassau, 56 A.D.2d 930, 393
N.Y.S.2d 48,49, appeal dismissed, 42 N.Y.2d 823,396 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1977).
66. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
67. Corwin v. Farrell, 303 N.Y. 61, 100 N.E.2d 135, 137-39 (1951). See Westchester County,
Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Cimino, 58 A.D.2d 869, 396 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1977), aff 'd without
opinion, 44 N.Y.2d 985, 380 N.E.2d 327,408 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1978).
68. Corwin v. Farrell, 303 N.Y. 61, 100 N.E.2d 135, 139 (1951); Varacchi v. State Univ. of
N.Y., 62 Misc. 2d 1003, 310 N.Y.S.2d 751, 754 (Sup. Ct. 1970). See Spencer v. Ryan, 237 A.D.
50, 260 N.Y.S. 798, 801 (1932).
69. See, e.g., Corwin v. Farrell, 303 N.Y. 61, 100 N.E.2d 135, 137, 139 (1951); Conlin v.
Aiello, 64 A.D.2d 921, 408 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (1978); Westchester County, Civil Serv.,Employees
Ass'n v. Cimino, 58 A.D.2d 869, 396 N.Y.S.2d 692, 694 (1977), aff 'd without opinion, 44 N.Y.2d
985, 380 N.E.2d 327, 408 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1978).
70. Beck v. Board of Educ., 268 A.D.2d 644, 52 N.Y.S.2d 712, 716 (1945), aff 'd, 295 N.Y.
717, 65 N.E.2d 426 (1946) (per curiam).
71. Westchester County, Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Cimino, 58 A.D.2d 869, 396
N.Y.S.2d 692, 694 (1977), aff 'd without opinion, 44 N.Y.2d 985, 380 N.E.2d 327, 408 N.Y.S.2d
501 (1978). See, e.g., Corwin v. Farrell, 303 N.Y. 61, 100 N.E.2d 135 (1951). In a recent case, for
example, although civil service janitors were discharged as a result of contracting out, the contract
was upheld as a legitimate means of providing the services more cost-efficiently. Conlin v. Aiello, 64
A.D.2d 921, 408 N.Y.S.2d'125, 128 (1978). In Washington, contracting out can result in the termi-
nation of civil service employees or positions only in limited circumstances because of the 1979 Act.
See note 85 and accompanying text infra.
72. 45 Ohio St. 2d 308, 345 N.E.2d 61 (1976) (per curiam).
73. Id. at 65. Plaintiff in Sigall argued that if a particular job has a civil service classification (a
janitor in this case), the civil service laws impliedly require that such "particularfunctions of state
government... be performed exclusively by civil service employees." Sigall v. Aetna Cleaning
Contractors, Inc., 47 Ohio App. 2d 242, 353 N.E.2d 913, 915 (1974) (emphasis added), aff 'd, 45
Ohio St. 2d 308, 345 N.E.2d 61 (1976) (per curiam). The Washington court in Spokane adopted an
analagous line of reasoning. 90 Wn. 2d at 700-01, 585 P.2d at 476. The Ohio Supreme Court re-
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agreement between a state university and a janitorial contractor saved the
state over $300,000 annually and did not cause the discharge of any civil
service employees. 74 The court reasoned that since civil servants could be
discharged for reasons of economy, and no statute prohibited such con-
tracting, the agreement was valid. 75
Other state courts have held that contracting out is a legitimate means
to discharge civil servants for reasons of economy 76 or as part of a good
faith reorganization, 77 provided the contract was made in good faith.78
jected plaintiff's argument, 345 N.E.2d at 64, and in doing so did not find it necessary to rely on
Ohio precedent which declared that agreements with independent contractors are permissible, State
ex rel. Bartholomew v. Witt, 3 Ohio App. 414, 418-19 (1914) (dictum); State ex tel. Bloom v.
Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 2 Ohio App. 40, 42 (1913) (dictum). See City of Cleveland v. Lausche, 70
Ohio App. 273, 49 N.E.2d 207, 210 (1943) (city may replace civil servants with services provided by
nonprofit corporation).
74. State ex rel. Sigall v. Aetna Cleaning Contractors, Inc., 45 Ohio St. 2d 308, 345 N.E.2d 61,
62-63 (1976) (per curiam).
75. Id. at 65. The Spokane court attempted to distinguish Sigall in two ways. 90 Wn. 2d at 702,
585 P.2d at 477. The court first pointed out that in Sigall the university was compelled to contract for
custodial services to some extent because a lack of applicants made it impossible to retain a full com-
plement of custodial workers. Id. See State ex rel. Sigall v. Aetna Cleaning Contractors, Inc., 345
N.E.2d at 62. It appears, however, that some of the work provided by contract personnel could have
been performed by civil service applicants. The contractor performed the custodial services for 13
specific buildings, id., and was not restricted to work the university was unable to perform due to the
shortage of applicants.
Spokane, however, relied exclusively on purported distinctions between the purposes of Ohio's
and Washington's merit systems in attempting to distinguish Sigall. 90 Wn. 2d at 702, 585 P.2d at
477. The Washington court stated Sigall ignored the "essential purpose" of Washington's civil ser-
vice system: the establishment of "a merit system regarding the selection, appointment and classifi-
cation, as well as the discipline and discharge, of state personnel." Id. The attempted distinction is
conclusory and not persuasive. The Ohio court enunciated the purpose of Ohio's civil service system
in a similar manner, 345 N.E.2d at 64, and declared that the merit system is designed to protect state
employees. Id. at 65. Accord, State ex rel. Alford v. Willoughby Civil Serv. Comm'n, 58 Ohio St.
2d 221, 390 N.E.2d 782, 787 (1979). The Spokane court likewise believed the merit system serves a
protective function for civil servants. See 90 Wn. 2d at 701-05, 585 P.2d at 476-78.
76. Connecticut State Employees Ass'n v. Board of Trustees, 165 Conn. 757, 345 A.2d 36
(1974). Cf. Ball v. Board of Trustees of the State Colleges, 251 Md. 685, 248 A.2d 650, 653 (1968)
(civil servants may be discharged by contracting out if done in good faith for bona fide reason). See
also Cunningham v. Community College Dist. No. 3, 79 Wn. 2d 793, 489 P.2d 891 (1971) (layoff of
civil service cafeteria employees, to be replaced by independent contractor, permissible but for em-
ployer's inability to prove "lack of funds").
77. University of Nev. v. State of Nev. Employees Ass'n, 90 Nev. 105, 520 P.2d 602, 605
(1974). Accord, Local 2855, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States, 602 F.2d 574, 583
(3d Cir. 1979).
78. Subjective good faith is not adequate; objective bona fide reasons must be present in order for
dismissal to be valid. University of Nev. v. State of Nev. Employees Ass'n, 90 Nev. 105, 520 P.2d
602, 605 n.2 (1974). Accord, Ball v. Board of Trustees of the State Colleges, 251 Md. 685, 248
A.2d 650, 654-55 (1968) (merit system not harmed because contracting out must be done in good
faith for bona fide reasons).
Whether civil servants were discharged in good faith is generally believed to be a question of law
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The law of Massachusetts, 79 Michigan, 80 Rhode Island, 81 Wisconsin, 82
and arguably Pennsylvania83 and Texas84 is also inconsistent with Spo-
kane's conclusion that contracting out and the purposes of the merit
system are incompatible.
In Washington, the 1979 Act prohibits termination of civil service em-
ployees or positions by contracting out only where the services are of a
type regularly purchased by a given agency before the Act's effective
for the court. H. KAPLAN, supra note 48, at 214-15. Accord, City of San Antonio v. Wallace, 161
Tex. 41, 338 S.W.2d 153, 157 (1960). Contra, State ex rel. Voris v. City of Seattle, 74 Wash. 199,
204, 133 P. 11, 13 (1913) (quoting People ex rel. Hartough v. Scannell, 48 A.D. 445, 62 N.Y.S.
930, 934, aff 'd without opinion, 163 N.Y. 599, 65 N.E. 1121 (1900)) (question of fact). See gener-
ally Annot., 87 A.L.R.3d 1165 (1978).
79. Civil servants may be discharged and replaced with contractor personnel if the public em-
ployer's decision is economically justifiable. In re City of Boston, 3 PUa. EMPL. BARGAIN. (CCH)
40,100 (Mass. Lab. Rel. Comm'n, August 24, 1977).
80. Davison Bd. of Educ., 3 LAB. L. REP. STATE LAWS (CCH) 49,999B.29 (Mich. Empl. Rel.
Comm'n, Oct. 25, 1973) (by implication); City of Flint, 3 LAB. L. REP. STATE LAWS (CCH)
49,999B.17 (Mich. Empl. Rel. Comm'n, Aug. 8, 1973) (by implication). See Van Buren Pub.
School Dist. v. Wayne County Circuit Judge, 61 Mich. App. 6, 232 N.W.2d 278, 286-91 (1975) (by
implication, but unclear whether public employees involved covered by a merit system).
81. Rhode Island, Univ. of Rhode Island, 1 PUB. EMPL. BARGAIN. (CCH) 13025 (R.I. Lab. Rel.
Bd., 1973) (dismissal of University civil service janitors).
82. While Wisconsin has a merit system, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 230.01 (West Supp. 1979), services
civil servants could provide may be contracted for if they "can be performed more economically or
efficiently by such contract." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 16.705 (West Supp. 1979). The only requirements
for entering into a contract are an administrative finding that the contractor can provide the services
more efficiently than civil servants, and the reasons supporting this finding must be set forth. 62 Op.
Wis. Arr'yGEN. 183, 185 (1973).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has arguably rejected the conclusion reached in Spokane. See State
exrel. Cooper v. Baumann, 231 Wis. 607, 286 N.W. 76, 78-79 (1939) (if school had not controlled
janitorial workers, thereby making them employees of school, such services could have been legiti-
mately provided by independent contractor) (by implication). See also Rehse v. Industrial Comm'n,
1 Wis. 2d 621, 85 N.W.2d 378 (1957) (contracting out allowed but unclear whether service had
been, or could be, performed by civil servants). But see Note, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 328 (arguing Rehse
incorrectly decided).
83. Pennsylvania Labor Rel. Bd. v. North Hills School Dist., 3 PUB. EMPL. BARGAIN. (CCH)
36,107 (Ct. Common Pleas, May 9, 1977); Pennsylvania Labor Rel. Bd. v. Garnet Valley School
Dist., 3 PUB. EMPL. BARGAIN. (CCH) 40,541 (Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd., Dec. 14, 1977). In both cases the
validity of contracting out was presumed, but it is unclear whether the public employees involved
were covered by a merit system.
84. See City of San Antonio v. Wallace, 161 Tex. 41, 338 S.W.2d 153 (1960). The Wallace
court held that civil service janitors would have been properly terminated by contracting out but for
the city's inability to prove they were discharged as a good faith economy measure. The court did not
object to contracting out which displaces civil servants, but stated only that such agreements are care-
fully scrutinized, since their "unrestricted use ... could obviously defeat the public policy of the
state, as evidenced by its civil service law." 338 S.W.2d at 158. California's nature of the services
test was rejected in dictum in a recent Texas case. Moncrief v. Tate, 561 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1978) (concurring opinion). See notes 91-102 and accompanying text infra (discussion of Cali-
fornia law).
Washington Law Review Vol. 55:419, 1980
date. 85 Under the better rule adopted by other states, 86 Washington state
agencies should be allowed to discharge civil servants by contracting out,
where the Act does not apply,87 if requisite dismissal criteria are satis-
fied 88 and the contract was made in good faith. 89 Such contracting out
85. In referring to contracts for services regularly purchased before the Act's effective date, a
proviso in the Act merely states that "no such contract" may cause the termination of classified
employees or positions. Act of April 23, 1979, ch. 46, §§ 1-2, 1979 Wash. Laws 1141-42 (codified
at WASH. REV. CODE § 28B. 16.240 and § 41.06.380 (1979)) (emphasis added), reproduced in rele-
vant part in note 14 supra. Statutory provisos are narrowly construed, and this proviso of the 1979
Act prohibiting termination of civil service employees or positions by contracting out should not be
interpreted as an indication of legislative intent that contracting out should never be allowed to pro-
duce such termination. See Jepson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 89 Wn. 2d 394, 403-04, 573
P.2d 10, 16 (1977) (proviso may not expand the enacting clause and additional exceptions may not be
implied beyond those stated); Seattle v. Western Union Tel. Co., 21 Wn. 2d 838, 850, 153 P.2d 859,
865 (1944) (quoting Sackman v. Thomas, 24 Wash. 660, 673, 64 P. 819, 823 (1901) (per curiam)).
86. See notes 61-78 and accompanying text supra.
87. See notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
88. Cunningham v. Community College Dist. No. 3, 79 Wn. 2d 793, 489 P.2d 891 (contracting
out which would result in layoff of civil servants permissible but for employer's inability to prove
any dismissal criteria were satisfied). According to Washington civil service regulations, civil ser-
vants may be discharged in a "good faith reorganization" for reasons of efficiency, or due to a "lack
of funds." WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 251-10-030(1), 356-30-330(1) (1977). The rule which permits
contracting out to result in the discharge of civil servants when contracting for reasons of "econ-
omy," see note 76 and accompanying text supra, should also apply when contracting out because of
a "lack of funds." To establish that a "lack of funds" exists a public employer need not be bankrupt
or unable to pay its employees' salaries. California School Employees Ass'n v. Pasadena Unified
School Dist., 71 Cal. App. 3d 320, 321, 139 Cal. Rptr. 633, 634 (1977). The term has been
construed to encompass a future lack of funds, Cunningham v. Community College Dist. No. 3, 79
Wn. 2d 793, 801, 489 P.2d 891, 895 (1971), and its connotation is arguably equivalent to "econ-
omy." See id. (by implication). Even if "lack of funds" cannot be construed to be substantially
equivalent to "economy," the state should nonetheless be permitted to discharge civil servants when
contracting out to achieve cost savings. A contrary interpretation would necessitate interpreting Spo-
kane to require that all services be provided by civil servants although this would impose an economic
burden on the public employer which could lead to a "lack of funds," with the eventual result that
civil service employees could be legitimately discharged. In Spokane, for example, a "lack of
funds" could conceivably have easily developed, because the College's budget was already inade-
quate to meet an unanticipated rise in enrollment. Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. Spokane
Community College, No. 54831, slip op. at 3 (Wash. Super. Ct., Thurston County, Nov. 24, 1976)
(memorandum decision on motion and cross-motion for summary judgment). Clearly it is more rea-
sonable to permit a public employer to contract out for good faith reasons of economy than to prohibit
the procurement of services from an independent contractor and have a possible "lack of funds"
develop which could lead both to the abolition of civil service positions and a diminution in public
services.
89. Cf., e.g., University of Wash. v. Harris, 24 Wn. App. 228, 230-31, 600 P.2d 653, 654
(1979) (The civil service "position to be eliminated and those to be retained when the budget is re-
duced is left to the good faith judgment of management."); State ex rel. Morris v. City of Seattle, 5
Wn. 2d 267, 269-70, 104 P.2d 1118, 1119 (1940); State ex rel. Gilmur v. City of Seattle, 83 Wash.
91, 145 P. 61 (1914); State ex rel. Voris v. City of Seattle, 74 Wash. 199, 133 P. !1 (1913)
(municipal civil servants may be discharged in good faith for reasons of economy). See also Annot.,
87 A.L.R.3d 1165, 1170 n.5 (1978). Since the 1979 Act prohibits only termination arising from a
contract for a type of service regularly purchased before April 23, 1979, see note 85 and accompany-
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should a fortiori be allowed when, as in Spokane, civil servants are not
discharged. 90
3. California precedent: The only support for Spokane
As a matter of policy 9' California courts have determined that the pur-
poses underlying a merit system92 require all services capable of being
performed by civil servants be so provided unless "specifically ex-
cepted." '93 California courts have held that the restrictions imposed on
contracting out by the nature of the services test are indispensable to
prevent weakening of the civil service system.94 The test for the legality
of a contract is whether the services could be provided by civil servants, 95
and economies that would result from contracting out are immaterial. 96
ing text supra, the Act can have anomalous effects on the job security of civil servants. For example,
if before April 23, 1979 an agency had regularly purchased some janitorial services, and some simul-
taneously had been provided by civil servants, the agency could not replace the civil service employ-
ees with contract personnel. If, however, all janitors before April 23, 1979 were civil servants, the
agency could contract out in good faith and discharge them if any requisite dismissal criterion had
been satisfied, see note 88 supra, because such services had not been regularly purchased by the
agency before April 23, 1979.
90. But cf. note 25 supra (how civil servants adversely affected by contracting out although they
are not discharged.).
91. California State Employees Ass'n v. Williams, 7 Cal. App. 3d 390, 397, 86 Cal. Rptr. 305,
310 (1970) (restriction on contracting out is a policy decision made to protect the civil service sys-
tem). See generally CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, BASIC TECHNIQUES OF PUBLIC CON-
"rAcrs PRAcncE § 21.25, at 338 (W. Huffcut & M. Haiken eds. 1977); Comment, Contracting with
the State Without Meeting Civil Service Requirements, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 363 (1957).
92. The Spokane court stated that the policies of California's and Washington's civil service sys-
tems are "identical." 90 Wn. 2d at 704, 585 P.2d at 478.
93. Stockburger v. Riley, 21 Cal. App. 2d 165, 68 P.2d 741, 743 (1937). All services should be
provided by civil servants unless a specific exemption to the civil service law applies. See CAL.
CONsT. art. 7, § 4 (exemptions to civil service law). Some exemptions have been judicially created.
See notes 96 & 98 infra. See also WASH. Rav. CODE § 28B.16.040 (1979); WASH. REv. CODE § 41.-
06.070 (1979) (exemptions from state civil service laws).
94. State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Riley, 9 Cal. 2d 126, 69 P.2d 985, 989 (1937); California
State Employees Ass'n v. Williams, 7 Cal. App. 3d 390, 397, 86 Cal. Rptr. 305, 310 (1970); Stock-
burger v. Riley, 21 Cal. App. 2d 165, 68 P.2d 741, 744 (1937).
95. [The dispositive criterion governing a contract's legality] is, not whether the person is an
"independent contractor" or an "employee," but whether the services contracted for, whether
temporary or permanent, are of such a nature that they could be performed by one selected under
the provisions of civil service. If the services could be so performed ... it is mandatory ... to
proceed in accordance with [the civil service laws].
State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Riley, 9 Cal. 2d 126, 69 P.2d 985, 989 (1937) (emphasis added).
Accord, Stockburger v. Riley, 21 Cal. App. 2d 165, 68 P.2d 741, 743 (1937). Contra, H. KAPLAN,
supra note 48, at 86 ("The relationship determines whether the employment is governed by the civil
service law. Whether the individual is an 'employee' or an 'independent contractor' is the real is-
sue.").
96. Stockburger v. Riley, 21 Cal. App. 2d 165, 68 P.2d 741, 742 (1937). The California
Attorney General, however, has interpreted Stockburger as rejecting economy as a conclusive factor
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Although in California an agency must use civil service personnel
where possible in expanding its operations, 97 a contract to provide a new
type of service is allowed if the state undertakes a new fiinction by con-
tracting out and the contract would not duplicate services provided by a
state agency. 98 This is true although some of the contractor's personnel
provide services which could be performed by civil servants. 99 The nature
of the services test, therefore, while usually determinative of a contract's
legality, is not applied in a procrustean fashion.10 0 This modification of
the nature of the services test produces a result largely indistinguishable
from Spokane's position.'10 Washington decisions regarding the legality
in determining a contract's legality, but economic considerations may be relevant. 24 Op. CAL. Arr'Y
GEN. 173, 175-76(1954). Other circumstances may make the nature of the services test inapplicable.
however. See 11 OP. CAL. Arr'Y GEN. 308, 314 (1948) (contracting out permissible if hiring pursuant
to civil service requirements would result in unacceptable delay); 2 Op. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 32 (1943)
(lessor may provide janitorial and similar services to state lessee). It is unclear whether services may
be contracted for which are needed only intermittently. A leading case suggests an agreement with an
independent contractor is permissible if services are to be rendered only periodically. Stockburger v.
Riley, 21 Cal. App. 2d 165, 68 P.2d 741, 744 (1937) (dictum). But see State Compensation Ins.
Fund v. Riley, 9 Cal. 2d 126, 69 P.2d 985, 989 (1937) (services of a "temporary" nature must be
provided by civil servants). The question seems to have been resolved inconsistently. Compare 2 Op.
CAL. Arr'v GEN. 79 (1943) (window cleaning at two separate intervals must be performed by civil
servants) with 24 Op. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 173, 176 (1954) (contract to deliver hunting and fishing li-
censes to retailers permissible because deliveries intermittent).
97. In Washington, under the 1979 Act, an agency which had regularly purchased a certain type
of service before the Act's effective date presumably could expand its operations by contracting out
for additional services of that type as long as no civil service employees or positions were thereby
terminated. See Act of April 23, 1979, ch. 46, 1979 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1141 (codified at
WASH. REv. Coo §§ 28B. 16.240, 41.06.380 (1979)), reproduced in relevant part in note 14 supra.
98. California State Employees Ass'n v. Williams, 7 Cal. App. 3d 390. 86 Cal. Rptr 305.
310-12 (1970) (medical services for the indigent). Cf. Jaynes v. Stockton. 193 Cal. App. 2d 47. 14
Cal. Rptr. 49 (1961) (illegal for school district to contract for services required to be performed by
county attorney). The "functional" test explained in Williams will sustain a contract if it "'calls for a
function not performed by any existing agency of the state government." 7 Cal. App. 3d at 397. 86
Cal. Rptr. at 310. Like the nature of the services test. it is designed to protect the civil service system.
for a contract permissible under the functional test does not impinge upon the existing structures of
the civil service system. Id.
99. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Ross, 28 Cal. 2d 569, 170 P.2d 904, 906 (1946) (clerical personnel)
City of San Francisco v. Boyd, 17 Cal. 2d 606, 110 P.2d 1036, 1043 (1941) (typist). California State
Employees Assn' v. Williams, 7 Cal. App. 3d 390, 86 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970) (clinical and staff per-
sonnel).
100. A literal application of the nature of the services test would require that if a contractor
performs a new function for the state (e.g., medical services for the indigent), civil servants must
perform services incidental to this function if they are capable of providing them (e.g., typing for the
contractor). See California State Employees Ass'n v. Williams, 7 Cal. App. 3d 390, 397, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 305, 310 (1970). See note 102 and accompanying text infra (conclusion by the Williams court
that the nature of the services test is anachronistic and would produce undesirable consequences if
rigidly applied). Cf. H. KAPLAN, supra note 48, at 87 (contracting out not a violation of civil service
laws although the contract implies that contractor's personnel, in addition to the contractor individu-
ally, will assist in its performance).
101. Spokane held that an agreement with an independent contractor will be illegal if (I) civil
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of contracting out will therefore presumably follow the California model
if Spokane is to be the guiding principle, although the nature of the ser-
vices test has been sharply criticized as anachronistic by a California ap-
pellate court. 102
III. PROPOSED RULE
Policy and precedent indicate Washington law should not evolve ac-
cording to the California model, but it must be recognized that unless
contracting out is adequately restricted it may threaten to significantly
damage the civil service system. 103 A rule should be adopted which elimi-
nates this possibility while maximizing administrative flexibility and gov-
ernmental economy. The following four-part rule is proposed as a means
of achieving these goals in the areas where the 1979 Act is not applicable.
A contract for services should be permitted where the following re-
quirements are met:
(1) The persons providing the services must be genuine employees of
servants could provide the services, and (2) the services customarily have been performed by civil
servants. As California law has evolved, two factors are simultaneously evaluated to determine if
contracting out is illegal: (1) whether civil servants could provide the services (the nature of the
services test), and (2) whether the services are available from an existing state agency (the functional
test). The first criterion of the California and Washington rules are identical, and although there is a
theoretical distinction between the second part of the Spokane rule and the functional test, their re-
spective application should produce similar results. For example, contracting for medical services as
in California State Employees Ass'n v. Williams, 7 Cal. App. 3d 390, 86 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970),
would be upheld under the Spokane rule since those services had not been provided customarily by
civil servants.
Although neither California nor Washington has adopted an unadulterated nature of the services
test, if a certain type of work has not been provided by civil servants in the past the state has probably
determined that civil servants are, either inherently, or for reasons of policy, "incapable" of provid-
ing the service. As a consequence, the first criterion of the California and Washington rules will in
most instances determine the agreement's legality. For this reason, it is not improper to refer to the
California and Washington rules as the nature of the services test, while recognizing the label's theo-
retical imprecision.
102. Whatever may have been the efficacy of the "nature of the services" test when it was
conceived in 1937, it is now evident that rigid application of that test would lead to untoward
and possibly chaotic results. . . . Certainly, the "nature of the services" formula seems
simplistic and inadequate when viewed in relation to modem techniques of public administra-
tion, which frequently involve the government in indirect rather than direct administrative oper-
ations.
California State Employees Ass'n v. Williams, 7 Cal. App. 3d 390, 396 n.3, 86 Cal. Rptr. 305, 309
n.3 (1970). The Supreme Court of California has found it necessary to engage in logical contortions
to avoid applying the nature of the services test, which perhaps indicates it has recognized sub silen-
io that the test can produce grossly unjust results. See In re McMillan's Estate, 46 Cal. 2d 121, 292
P.2d 881 (1956).
103. City of San Antonio v. Wallace, 161 Tex. 41, 338 S.W.2d 153, 157-58 (1960). Inherent
practical considerations, however, should prevent contracting out on a large scale. See H. WELLING-
rON & R. WiNTER, supra note 38, at 65.
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the contractor. 04 The merit system would obviously be circumvented if
the state were permitted to hire its own employees without complying
with civil service requirements. 105
(2) The agreement must be made in good faith. This should be inter-
preted as an objective standard, requiring proof that contracting out
would result, with a reasonable degree of predictability at the time the
contract is made, in improved economy.10 6
(3) The public employer should have the burden of proving the con-
tract was made in objective good faith. 107 If this initial requirement is sat-
104. In most instances the crucial factor will be the degree of control the public employer
exercises over the contract personnel. See note 8 supra.
105. See H. KAPLAN, supra note 48, at 99. State employees must be hired pursuant to the civil
service law even if the parties in good faith failed to comply with its requirements. See State ex rel.
Pioli v. Higher Educ. Personnel Bd., 16 Wn. App. 642, 558 P.2d 1364 (1976). Accord, note 63 and
accompanying text supra (New York law).
106. The Spokane trial court, for example, found that the College acted in good faith because the
proven cost savings which could be made by contracting out would be consistent with the prudent
management practice of not overburdening taxpayers by incurring unnecessary costs, and the
resulting savings would provide the College's students with a better education. Washington Fed'n of
State Employees v. Spokane Community College, No. 54831, slip op. at 5-7 (Wash. Super. Ct.,
Thurston County, Nov. 24, 1976) (memorandum decision on motion and cross-motion for summary
judgment). Cf. Burkhart v. Moore, 580 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (good faith would
be present as a matter of law if properly demonstrated that civil service position was abolished be-
cause of "improved economy"). Although contracting out will result in a demonstrable improvement
in economy, an agreement should nonetheless be struck down if an employer's action was substan-
tially motivated by other considerations which constitute bad faith. Contracting out due to an anti-
union animus, for example, is generally impermissible. See City of Flint, 3 LAB. L. RE'. STATE LAWS
(CCH) 49,998B. 17 (Mich. Empl. Rel. Comm'n, Aug. 27, 1973); Local 634, Wisconsin Council of
County and Mun. Employees v. City of Menomonie, 3 PUB. EMPL. BARGAIN (CCH) 40,733 (Wis.
Empl. Rel. Comm'n, May 3, 1978); D. STANLEY & C. CooPER, MANAGING LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER
UNION PRESSURE 91 (1972); Comment, Plant Removals, Shutdowns and Subcontracts under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 38 TEMP. L.Q. 299, 301 (1965).
107. City of San Antonio v. Wallace, 161 Tex. 41, 338 S.W.2d 153, 158 (1960); R. VAUGHN,
supra note 31, § 4.4, at 4-24 to -25. Placing the burden upon the employer to prove the contract with
an independent contractor was made in good faith would require a change in Washington law. See
Rosso v. State Personnel Bd., 68 Wn. 2d 16, 20, 411 P.2d 138, 140-41 (1966) (presumption that
public officials will not act to contravene civil service law); State ex rel. Voris v. City of Seattle, 74
Wash. 199, 202, 205, 133 P. 11, 12-13 (1913) (presumption that city abolished civil service position
in good faith); Schreiber v. Riemcke, 11 Wn. App. 873, 878, 526 P.2d 904, 908 (1974) (government
officials presumed to perform duties in good faith). But cf. Cunningham v. Community College Dist.
No. 3, 79 Wn. 2d 793, 489 P.2d 891 (1971) (public employer required to prove requisite criterion
satisfied to lay off civil servants). The facility with which the public employer should be able to
demonstrate contracting out will improve efficiency, and the corresponding difficulty for civil service
employees of effectively disputing the employer's contentions, provide adequate justification for the
change. See City of San Antonio v. Wallace, 161 Tex. 41, 338 S.W.2d 153, 158 (1960); R. VAUGHN,
supra, § 4-4, at 4-24. Cf. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967) (if employer's
conduct affects employees rights, employer had burden of showing his motivation was legitimate,
.since proof of motivation is most accessible" to the employer); C. McCouMIcK, EVIDENCE § 337, at
787 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) (party which has sole knowledge of facts has burden of proof). This
evidentiary burden should not significantly hinder administrative action and discretion. R. VAUGHN,
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isfied, the employees should have the burden of proving improper moti-
vation on the part of the public employer. 108
(4) Civil servants may be discharged by contracting out, but only if a
specified discharge criterion is satisfied. 109
This proposed rule should adequately protect the civil service sys-
tem,110 and is consistent with the fundamental policies underlying that
system. Contracting out will be allowed only in the interest of greater
economy or efficiency, a spoils system will not arise, "'1 and civil servants
will be protected from arbitrary action by their employer. Unlike the un-
necessarily restrictive Spokane rule, 12 the proposed rule provides state
agencies with more administrative flexibility, and permits savings to be
made which can be used for other governmental activities1 13 or for reduc-
ing the burden upon the taxpaying public. 114
supra, § 4-4, at 4-25. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 1213, 1219 (1962) (Smith, Arb.)
(proper allocation of proof in private sector in determining if employer contracted in good faith).
108. R. VAUGHN, supra note 31, § 4-4, at 4-25. Thus, for example, if the public employer dem-
onstrates that contracting out will be more cost-efficient, the employees or their union will then be
required to prove the agreement was improperly motivated (e.g., the employer contracted out
because of an anti-union animus). See note 106 supra.
109 Cunningham v. Community College Dist. No. 3, 79 Wn. 2d 793, 489 P.2d 891 (1971).
These requirements are: (1) curtailment of work; (2) lack of funds; or (3) a good faith reorganization
for efficiency purposes. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 251-10-030(1) (1977); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 356-30-
330(1) (1977). Only the latter two requirements are applicable to contracting for services.
110. Inherent practicalities should prevent large-scale contracting out, see H. WELLINGTON & R.
Vr, supra note 38, at 65, and the proposed rule errs on the side of ensuring protection for civil
servants by requiring the public employer to prove it contracted out in objective good faith. New
York, which has adopted a rule less severe than that announced in Spokane, has nonetheless not
experienced a deterioration in its civil service system, see note 44 supra, although the initial burden is
on employees to prove the employer acted in bad faith. Wipfler v. Klebes, 284 N.Y. 248, 30 N.E.2d
581, 585 (1940); Turner v. Berle, 61 A.D.2d 712, 404 N.Y.S.2d 50, 52 (1978); Abbott v. City of
Poughkeepsie, 98 Misc. 2d 60 1, 414 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
111. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text supra.
112. See notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra.
113. The community college system provides an excellent example of the possible adverse eco-
nomic consequences the Spokane rule may produce. This system is predicated upon an "open door
concept," i.e., community college education should be available "to every citizen . . . at a cost
normally within his economic means." WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.50.020(1) (1979). By not allowing
the state to benefit from available economies afforded by contracting out, the Spokane rule could very
likely raise the cost of a community college education. See, e.g., note 88 supra. "There will be a
strong tendency to meet the rising costs of community college education by the simple expedient of
increasing the tuition and fee structure. Each increase diminishes the opportunities for some to attend
a community college, and the result is that the open-door concept is lost." JoIT COMMITTEE ON EDUCA-
OoN, EDUCATON IN WASHNrON 99 (1968) (Fifth Biennial Report to 41st Session, Wash. State Legis-
lature). Under the test proposed, savings could be made and the open door concept thereby fostered.
114. See State ex rel. Voris v. Seattle, 74 Wash. 199, 208, 133 P. 11, 14 (1913) (right of taxpay-




Washington law on contracting for services civil servants could pro-
vide is governed by the 1979 Act and the Spokane decision where the Act
is not applicable. 115 The Spokane rule prevents state agencies from
contracting for services civil servants are capable of performing and have
customarily provided. State agencies and institutions should not be so re-
stricted, for the Spokane rule is contrary to sound considerations of public
policy and the clear weight of precedent. The Washington Supreme Court
should renounce Spokane and adopt a rule which adequately protects the
civil service system from the potential abuses of contracting out while
maximizing administrative flexibility and governmental economy.
Timothy P. Dowling
WASHINGTON, FINAL REPORT 4 (1976) (Washington state government must increase quality and quan-
tity of public services at equivalent expense to taxpayers).
115. See notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
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